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Abstract— Up to 25 percent of all anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions are caused by deforestation, 
and Indonesia is the third largest emitter worldwide due 
to land use change and deforestation. On the island of 
Sulawesi in the vicinity of the Lore Lindu National Park, 
smallholders contribute to conversion processes at the 
forest margin as a result of their agricultural practices. 
Specifically the area dedicated to cocoa plantations has 
increased from zero in 1979 to nearly 18,000 hectares in 
2001. Some of these plots have been established inside 
the 220,000 hectares of the National Park. An 
intensification process is observed with a consequent 
reduction of the shade tree density. 
This study focuses on the impact of carbon 
sequestration payments for forest management systems 
on smallholder households. The level of incentives is 
determined which motivates farmers to desist from 
further deforestation and land use intensification 
activities. Household behaviour and resource allocation 
is analysed with a comparative static linear 
programming model. As these models prove to be a 
reliable tool for policy analysis, the output can indicate 
the adjustments in resource allocation and land use 
shifts when introducing compensation payments.  
The data was collected in a household survey in six 
villages around the Lore Lindu National Park. Four 
household categories were identified according to their 
dominant agroforestry systems.  
With carbon credit prices up to €32 tCO2e
-1 an 
incentive can be provided for the majority of the 
households to adopt the more sustainable shade 
intensive agroforestry systems. The results show that 
with current carbon prices the deforestation activities of 
the majority of households could be stopped. A win-win 
situation seems to appear, whereby, when targeting only 
the shade intensive agroforestry systems with carbon 
payments, the poorest households economically benefit 
the most, the vicious circle of deforestation can be 
interrupted and land use systems with high 
environmental benefits are promoted.   
Keywords— Payments for Environmental Services, 
Avoided Deforestation, Linear Programming. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Primary forests are still lost or modified at a rate of 
six million hectares per year because of selective 
logging or deforestation, and there is no indication that 
the rate is slowing [1]. Deforestation in turn plays an 
important role in the global warming process, as it 
accounts for up to 25 percent of global greenhouse gas 
emissions [2]. About 49 percent of Indonesia’s land 
area is covered by forest. The remaining forest area, 
however, is under constant threat, as Indonesia has the 
second highest annual net loss in forest worldwide 
with two percent per year between 2000 and 2005 [1]. 
Indonesia is among the top three greenhouse gas 
emitters in the world with three billion tonnes of 
carbon dioxide (CO2). The main factor for this high 
rate are the emissions caused by deforestation and land 
conversion, which account for 83 percent of the annual 
greenhouse gas emissions in Indonesia [3].  
Deforestation is a difficult issue to tackle on a 
national scale, as its drivers are complex. Five broad 
categories can be determined as its underlying driving 
forces. These are demographic, economic, 
technological, policy and institutional, and cultural 
factors. In general, at the proximate level 
infrastructure extension, agricultural expansion, as 
well as wood extraction are the main driving forces for 
tropical deforestation and land use change. [4]. The 
majority of deforestation incidences is connected to 
agricultural expansion. The incentive for forest 
conversion for many smallholders can be attributed to 
the fact that other land uses such as permanent 
cropping, cattle ranching, shifting cultivation, and 
colonization agriculture yield higher revenues than 
forestry. Through their traditional land use practices, 
smallholders often contribute to deforestation 
processes. Hence, local emissions of carbon are 
affected and carbon stocks and associated fluxes are 
often negatively influenced. In Indonesia, the main 
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factors for forest conversion are wood extraction, 
unplanned agricultural expansion and forest fires. An 
additional driving force has been the accelerated 
demand for palm oil. Approximately 27% of the 
concessions for new palm oil plantations are on 
peatland tropical rainforests, covering 2.8 million 
hectares [5]. 
  In the Kyoto Protocol forestry activities, or so-
called “carbon sink projects
1” are recognized as an 
important means of mitigating greenhouse gas 
emissions, since CO2 is removed through 
photosynthesis. Thus, forestry projects which result in 
additional greenhouse gases being actively sequestered 
from the atmosphere and stored in sinks, can generate 
certified emission reductions (CER)
2. To create a 
homogenous tradable commodity, emission reductions 
of any greenhouse gas are traded in form of tonnes of 
carbon dioxide equivalent  (CO2e) which means that 
the climate change potential of each greenhouse gas is 
expressed as an equivalent of the climate change 
potential of CO2 [6]. Under the current rules of the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
3 only 
afforestation and reforestation activities are considered 
eligible. However, in the on-going climate discussions, 
as during the UNFCCC Climate Conference in Bali, 
Indonesia in 2007, other sink activities, such as 
reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation 
(REDD) are high on the political agenda. This 
discussion was first initiated by the Rainforest 
Coalition, a group of developing nations with 
rainforest who formally offered voluntary carbon 
emission reductions by conserving forests in exchange 
for access to international markets for emissions 
trading. It is especially the forest-rich countries, such 
                                                           
1 The term carbon sinks is applied to pools or reservoirs, such as 
forests, oceans and soils, which absorb carbon, and for which 
carbon storage exceeds carbon release. The process of capturing 
carbon from the atmosphere and storing it in vegetation biomass is 
referred to as sequestration. 
2The terms certificates, carbon credits and CER are used 
interchangeably. One credit is the equivalent of one tonne of CO2 
emissions. 
3 The CDM provides for Annex I Parties (most OECD countries 
and countries in transition) to implement projects that reduce 
emissions in non-Annex I countries in return for CER, and assist 
the host Parties in achieving sustainable development. The CERs 
can be used by Annex I countries to help meet their emission 
targets [7]. 
as Brazil and Indonesia, who are pushing for the 
financial acknowledgement of forest conservation.  
On the island of Sulawesi in Indonesia, the forest 
margin of the Lore Lindu National Park (LLNP), 
which covers 220,000 hectares, has been facing 
encroachment and consequently deforestation. The 
main activities to be observed are an expansion of the 
area dedicated to agricultural activities by 20 percent 
during the last two decades, the tripling of the 
perennial crop plantations area and expansion into 
former forest areas, as well as selective and clear-cut 
logging. A village survey in 2001 revealed that 70 
percent of the villages bordering the LLNP have 
agricultural land inside the Park [8]. A satellite image 
analysis detected a mean annual deforestation rate of 
0.3 percent in the research region between 1983 and 
2002 [9]. However, cocoa plantations under shade 
trees cannot be detected by optical satellite 
instruments, thus, the encroachment process at the 
forest margin is not fully reflected by this figure. In 
the vicinity of the LLNP, a great spatial heterogeneity 
of agricultural production is apparent. In general, 
human activities are much more concentrated in the 
northern and western part of the Park than in the south. 
For example in the north-east the closed forest 
decreased by 35 percent between 2001 and 2004 due 
to logging, whereas the area covered by cocoa 
plantations increased by 11 percent [10]. In addition, 
an intensification process among the cocoa 
agroforestry systems (AFS), whereby farmers 
gradually reduce the shade tree cover, can be 
observed. The focus of the present research is 
therefore to assess the impact of payments for carbon 
sequestration activities on the smallholders in the 
regions bordering the LLNP in Indonesia, and whether 
such payments can provide an incentive for the 
adoption of more sustainable and shade tree intensive 
land use practices and contribute to the conservation 
of the rainforest. 
II. FRAMEWORK 
The research is motivated by the need to understand 
which level of incentives is required for a stimulation 
of the farmers to desist from further deforestation and 
land use intensification activities. Internationally the 
awareness for the requirement to develop and support 
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payment mechanisms and incentives for the provision 
and preservation of environmental services such as 
biodiversity conservation, preservation of landscape 
beauty, watershed management and carbon 
sequestration is growing. Initiatives and projects are 
promoted where local actors are given payments in 
return for switching to more sustainable land-use 
practices and ecosystem protection. They usually 
imply the payments to be made by the beneficiaries of 
the environmental services. These “payments for 
environmental services” (PES) policies have been 
defined by Wunder [11], as voluntary, conditional 
agreements between at least one “seller” and one 
“buyer” over a well-defined environmental service – 
or a land use presumed to produce that service. PES, 
being market-based mechanisms, can render forestry 
to be a competitive land use and farmers and loggers 
might decide to change their land use practices to 
retain or replant trees if they receive sufficient 
remuneration. In the case of deforestation avoidance, 
farmers can receive a compensation payment as an 
incentive not to cut down the forest and use the timber 
or put the land to agricultural use. This is in line with 
the “compensated reduction” proposal, according to 
which countries electing to reduce their national 
emissions from deforestation would be authorized to 
issue carbon certificates, similar to the CERs of the 
CDM, which could be sold to governments or private 
investors to fulfil their emission targets [12].  
In the region around the LLNP four cocoa 
agroforestry systems can be distinguished according to 
the degree of shading and shade tree species, as well 
as the management intensity: AFS I exhibits a high 
degree of shading with natural forest trees and a low 
management intensity, while at the other end of the 
spectrum AFS IV involves intensive management and 
fully sun grown cocoa. The gross margins of cocoa 
consistently increase along the cocoa AFS gradient 
from I towards IV. There seems to be a trade-off 
situation between an intensification of the cocoa 
cultivation with shade free plantations and higher 
economic returns and shade-grown, low intensity 
management cocoa with lower returns and biodiversity 
conservation. Even though the cocoa grown in full sun 
has higher mean yields and obtains substantially 
higher gross margin values in comparison with shade 
grown cocoa, in the long run the intensification is 
likely to be unsustainable. Anticipated consequences 
are agronomic risks, such as declining soil nutrient 
levels, as well as socio-economic dangers like the 
dependency on single crops and a negative impact on 
local food security [13]. Additionally, the AFS I 
provides high biodiversity values and habitat for the 
native fauna, whereas the establishment of shade free 
cocoa plantations reduces the landscape level diversity 
by eliminating secondary forests on fallow land and 
may adversely affect the soil fertility [14]. Another 
study assessed the species-richness of plants and 
animals and ecosystem functioning [15]. This study 
did not discover a linear gradient of biodiversity loss 
in the four agroforestry systems, but deduced that only 
small quantitative changes in biodiversity and 
ecosystem functioning occurred when changing from 
AFS II to III. However, they also conclude that in the 
long run the intensification and reduction of shade 
trees is an unsustainable path. Unfortunately, this 
process already takes place in the region. A 
willingness to pay study, which suggests a higher 
preference for low shade agroforestry systems among 
the local farmers, supports these results [16]. Thus, to 
prevent an intensification of the agroforestry systems 
to monocultures in the region, economic incentives are 
required. These could be price premiums, as they are 
already available for a long time for fair trade and 
organic coffee. Alternatives could also be carbon 
certificates which can offer an incentive for the more 
shade grown, biodiversity rich and sustainable cocoa 
agroforestry system and slow down the intensification 
process.  
Another important phenomenon in the region is that 
many of the Bugis households who were resettled by 
the government in the 1990s from South Sulawesi and 
Poso into the research area started to buy land from 
the local ethnic groups, the Kaili’s and Kulawi’s. In 
many cases the local ethnic households had originally 
obtained this land by clearing primary forest on the 
border of the National Park [17, 18]. They consider 
themselves to be the owner’s of the village territory 
and do not see the necessity to buy land, but in turn 
realised the opportunity to generate additional income 
by selling parts of their land. This money is usually 
used for buying status symbols or for ceremonial 
purposes, which require substantial amounts of cash 
[19]. In due course they are often in need for further 
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land for their own cropping activities, since the 
majority of them are at least to some extent 
subsistence farmers, leading to additional 
encroachment of the forest margin of the National 
Park. 
The debate with respect to REDD has gained 
momentum after the UNFCCC Conference in 2007. 
Before this date very few of these avoided 
deforestation projects existed and many policy makers, 
scientists and NGOs have been very sceptical of their 
practical implementation and success. In 1997, one of 
the most prominent forest conservation projects was 
set up, the Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action 
Project in Bolivia. Three private investors, American 
Electric Power, PacifiCorp and BP Amoco, as well as 
the Nature Conservancy and the Bolivian Government  
implemented this 11 million US$ project to protect 
832,000 hectares of tropical forest. Approximately one 
million tCO2e are generated within the project lifespan 
of 30 years and the offsets are awarded to the Bolivian 
Government which will sell these on the Chicago 
Climate Exchange. The revenue earned goes towards 
the park protection, community development and 
capacity building [20]. The notion of avoided 
deforestation has been given considerable prominence 
in the Stern Review published in 2006 by the British 
Government. Currently, the World Bank establishes 
the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility which is 
designed to set incentives for reducing deforestation 
rates and decrease greenhouse gas emissions. It will 
support a REDD project to protect 750,000 hectares of 
the Ulu Masen rainforest in Sumatra, Indonesia which 
is expected to generate  over  100 million tonnes of 
carbon offsets over 30 years. Additional finance 
comes from the US investment bank Merrill Lynch, as 
well as the World Bank Multi-Donor Fund’s Aceh 
Environment and Forest project.  
Several studies look at the potential of avoided 
deforestation projects in terms of contributing towards 
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, as well as 
the possible markets for REDD credits. Laurance [21] 
sees the potential for a viable mechanism for using 
tradable carbon offsets to protect rainforests. By 
reducing deforestation a significant cutback of 
greenhouse gas emissions can be attained and 
developing countries, especially forest-rich nations, 
could potentially gain large revenues from carbon 
credits. Ebeling and Yasue [22] calculate that if 10% 
of the deforestation rate is reduced, for a range of 
carbon prices of €5-30 tCO2e
-1 between €1.5-9.1 
billion per year could be generated globally. The 
prices for carbon certificates fluctuate widely, 
depending on the type of certificate. Additionally, the 
voluntary greenhouse gas emission offset markets are 
evolving rapidly, especially in the United States. 
Looking at permanent CER, a wide variation of prices 
can be observed. In 2006 certificates were traded in a 
range between US$ 6.30 up to US$ 27.01 per tCO2e, 
with an average of US$ 10.90 [23]. In the CDM 
counter issued by the GTZ in December 2007, the 
CER prices per tCO2e observed were between €5 and 
€18. The usual range for voluntary forest offset 
projects was between €3-30 tCO2e
-1 [24], and avoided 
deforestation prices averaged $4.80 tCO2e
-1 [25].  
Accordingly, we investigate whether current carbon 
credit prices are sufficient on the one hand to induce 
farmers to adopt more sustainable land use practices 
and on the other hand to make them desist from 
further forest conversion activities. The purpose of this 
paper is to provide an insight into whether 
environmental service payment schemes could have an 
impact on land use changes, and specifically which 
level of incentives would be necessary for the 
currently demanded policies to reduce emissions from 
deforestation, and thus, contribute to the conservation 
of the rainforest.    
III. DATA AND METHODS 
A. Linear programming model 
We chose a comparative static linear programming 
model to analyse the behaviour of the households and 
their resource allocation. These models simulate the 
farmers’ reaction to interventions and the effect of 
technology changes on economic decisions about 
natural resource use management [26]. Linear 
programming has proven to be a reliable method for 
studying the impact of policy activities, such as in this 
case carbon payments [27]. As with all methods, there 
are some limitations, such as the assumption of certain 
values and preferences when specifying the objective 
function, the possibility of non-linearity and feedback 
between variables, as well as the dynamics of systems. 
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One has to be aware of these problems, but for the 
purpose of this research linear programming has been 
considered an appropriate method. Especially, since it 
is a useful technique to assess technology changes or 
adoption potentials ex ante, so that careful planning 
for new policies or strategies can be undertaken. As an 
input for the model, the gross margins for the main 
cropping activities paddy rice, upland rice, maize and 
cocoa were calculated. Additionally, forest conversion 
activities based on various economic-political-
environmental parameters from the research region 
were included to portray the behaviour of the 
smallholders as realistically as possible. Given the 
objective function, the solution procedure maximises 
the total gross margin (TGM) of the farm by finding 
the optimal set of activities for the household type, 
under the respective restrictions such as farm size, 
suitability of the land for various crops, food security, 
the credit limit, family work force, and the seasonal 
peak requirement of labour for each activity. The 
credit limit is the maximum amount of credit that a 
household expects to be able to borrow from formal 
and informal sources [28]. The farm conditions are 
stable, thus risk and time dimensions are not included 
in the model. Risk is not accounted for, as the farmer 
has information about alternative production activities, 
and input and output prices. In the research region 
most of the agroforestry plots contain trees of mixed 
age, therefore there is no clearly defined investment 
period and time of returns. Hence, the time lag 
between investment and returns has been ignored, as 
there are always some trees which can already be 
harvested whilst the others still mature. Furthermore, 
initial investment costs are very low and the additional 
labour in the first three unproductive years of the 
cocoa tree cannot be clearly separated from other 
activities necessary for the already productive trees on 
the cocoa plots. In another study in the same region 
which focused on smallholder cocoa farmers’ 
technology adoption, application and optimisation, the 
same conditions apply and similar assumptions were 
used for the linear programming model [29].  
B. Farm household types 
The data on the existing agricultural production 
systems for the model was collected in a household 
survey in six villages in the surroundings of the LLNP 
in 2006. We categorised the households according to 
the dominant agroforestry system among their cocoa 
plots, and determined four corresponding household 
types (HHI - HHIV). A random sample of 46 
households was drawn from the total sample of 325 
households in 13 villages from the research project. 
These were randomly selected based on a stratified 
sampling method [30] for a household survey in 2001 
and 2004. The survey at hand focused on general 
aspects of the household and farm characteristics, land 
resources and their use, agricultural production 
activities, forest use, as well as the households’ 
perception of the LLNP, the forest, and its functions. 
The four household types have different resource 
endowments, such as land and labour availability and 
their credit limit. The major characteristics are 
presented in Table 1 in order to indicate the 
differences between them. 
Table 1 Characteristics of household classes I-IV 
(Source: own data) 
  Household class 
  I II  III  IV 
Total cultivated land (ha)  2.5  2.8  2.8  2.5 
Cocoa AFS I (ha)  1.49  0.24  0  0 
Cocoa AFS II (ha)  0.77  1.31  1.09  0.33 
Cocoa AFS III (ha)  0.25  1.16  1.73  0 
Cocoa AFS IV (ha)  0.02  0  0  1.72 
Family labour days per month   32.4  29.5  34.4  31.6 
Credit limit (€/year)  33  720  1,015  570 
Ethnicity (% non-local HHs)  0  19  22  80 
 
Thus, one can see that the household type I has the 
lowest credit limit and the least cultivated land. The 
main share of the land is dedicated to the cocoa AFS I. 
Mainly the local Kaili, Kulawi and Napu households 
own this plot type. Household types II and III have an 
increasing credit limit and most land available for 
cultivation, and they dedicate most of their land to 
AFS II and AFS II, respectively. In these household 
classes the share of migrants, such as Bugis, Toraja 
and Poso families, becomes more dominant. 
Household type IV, who is mainly non-local, 
predominantly grows the intensively managed AFS 
IV. However, its credit limit is only the second highest 
and its land availability is the same as that of 
household type I. This could be an indication that with 
limited credit and land availability they adopt a more 
intensive production system in comparison to the other 
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household types. With the help of a poverty 
assessment tool based on principle component analysis 
[31] the households in the region were classified into 
poverty groups according to their relative welfare. The 
N (0.1)-normally distributed poverty index allows to 
group the households into terciles and makes it 
possible to draw comparisons between the poorest, 
poor and better off households. 67 percent of the type I 
households belong to the poorest households, whereas 
63 percent of the type IV households can be 
categorised as better off. The households of the two 
other categories fall into all three welfare groups. We 
note, that there is a poverty gradient to be found from 
HHI towards HHIV. 
C.  Carbon accounting methodology 
For carbon accounting the amount of carbon 
sequestration which is to be claimed as a “carbon 
credit” is limited to the net amount of change in the 
total forest carbon pool from one period to the next. In 
order to obtain the site specific total above- and below 
ground biomass for cocoa trees, a logarithmic growth 
regression model was adopted (highest R
2 value of 
0.76). The biomass can then be converted to carbon 
using a conversion factor of 0.5g of carbon 
respectively for 1g of biomass [32].  To obtain the 
tradable commodity CO2e, the conversion factor for 
carbon of 3.667 is used. The results show that for this 
specific region a cocoa tree, on average, stores 8.05 kg 
carbon over a time span of 25 years, with the more 
intensively managed and densely planted AFS IV 
accumulating more carbon (46 kg/ha) than the less 
intensively managed systems I-III (39 kg/ha). 
Additionally, 0.5 t ha
-1 yr
-1 of soil organic carbon was 
added, a figure from the literature [33], as no site-
specific data exists. Due to lack of data, the calculation 
for carbon accumulation in soils is assumed to occur 
linearly in time.
4 All carbon measurements for above-, 
below-ground and soil carbon were added up to obtain 
an estimate of the total carbon per hectare of the cocoa 
trees. Finally, this amount was converted to CO2e, 
which is the basis to calculate the amount of 
                                                           
4 For comparison, the total carbon pool has also been calculated 
excluding soil carbon. As the difference is quite small (3 percent 
decrease in annuity payment), it is assumed that it is acceptable to 
include soil carbon. 
certificates to be obtained for the different agroforestry 
systems. 
According to the Kyoto protocol, all credits from 
sink projects have a temporary status and expire after a 
certain time. Only trees which are planted at the 
beginning of the crediting period can be assigned 
temporary certificates of emission reductions (tCER). 
A tCER is defined as a CER issued for an afforestation 
project activity under the CDM, which expires at the 
end of the commitment period following the one in 
which it is issued [34]. The tCER are limited to five 
years, after which they can be re-issued. Once the 
tCER are not re-certified, a permanent solution is 
needed to fulfil the reduction requirements. As we 
envisaged a total project horizon of 25 years and 
applied an accounting scheme of tCER, we assume the 
carbon credits will be issued five times. To make 
things straightforward for this calculation, we assumed 
that the credits are synchronous with the commitment 
periods, so that they are issued at the end of the first 
commitment period and expire five years later at the 
end of the next commitment period [35, 36]. In 
addition, we argue that the annual net rate of carbon 
accumulation of the shading trees in the first three 
land-use systems should be accounted for. Otherwise 
there is a great incentive for purely sun grown cocoa 
plantations, as these are more densely planted and 
hence, the total carbon accumulation per hectare is 
higher than in the more shade intensive agroforestry 
systems. This could even foster further cutting down 
of the shading trees. The carbon fixation of the shade 
trees has been estimated based on a study by Brown et 
al. [37] and included in the carbon budget for the AFS 
I, II and III. The tCER for the first five year crediting 
period are related to the cumulative carbon storage of 
the agroforestry system. The first credits are generated 
after five years. These tCER expire after five years, 
but are reissued in year 10 together with additional 
tCER. The same procedure is applied for the following 
5-year periods until the last issuance of tCER in year 
25, and reflects the total net storage of CO2 since the 
project started.  
The prices for tCERs represent only a fraction of 
the prices for regular CERs from other project 
categories such as energy projects. Forestry 
certificates expire after a certain time period, so they 
are only allocated non-permanent certificates. These 
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must be replaced by permanent ones at some point in 
the future, hence, the non-permanent credits need to be 
converted to permanent CER. Therefore, the value of 
the temporary credits can be seen as the difference 
between the current permanent credit price and the 
discounted value of the future permanent credit price:  
T *) d + 1 (
T CER P
0 CER P =
0 tCER P              (1) 
where CER0 is the price of the CERs today and 
CERT the price of permanent CERs discounted at rate 
d*  found in Annex I-countries and T is the expiring 
time of tCER [38].  
For the conversion the CER prices are assumed to 
be constant over time (p CER 0 = p CER T), and a three 
percent discount rate (d*) is taken, which reflects the 
current low interest rates in Annex I countries [39]. As 
a tCER has a duration of five years, its value 
according to the equivalence relation in (1) is only 
about 14 percent of that of a permanent credit.  
The annual remuneration to the farmer was obtained 
for each land-use system through the calculation of the 
net present value, using equation (2), where d 
represents the discount rate in Indonesia and T the 5 
year periods from year 5 until 25. The calculations 
refer to the net carbon accumulation. 
25 ) d + 1 (
25 ) storage   2 CO net  (
+ ... + 10 ) d + 1 (
10 ) storage   2 CO net  (
+
5 ) d + 1 (
5 ) storage   2 CO net  (
= ) d + 1 ( tCER Σ
T
       (2) 
For the linear programming model the net present 
values are converted to annuities, in order to show the 
annual payments which the farmer would receive from 
a 25 year sequestration project. The equivalent annuity 
method expresses the net present value as an 
annualised cash flow by dividing it by the present 
value of the annuity factor. The annuity factor is 
calculated according to formula (3), where i represents 
the interest rate and n the number of years. The real 
interest rate of 10 percent is taken, which is the rate to 
be found in Indonesia in 2006 [40], and the time span 
is 25 years. Finally the annuity factor is multiplied by 
the net present value to obtain the annuity. 
1 ) i + 1 (
) i + 1 ( × i
= AF n
n
i , n                                                           (3) 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. Impact of carbon payments on smallholders’ land 
use systems 
Results from the linear programming model indicate 
that when payments for carbon sequestration are 
introduced for the prevailing agroforestry system, the 
impact in absolute terms on the TGM from cropping 
activities does not differ very much between the four 
household types. Depending on the credit prices, the 
increase in the TGM ranges between €10 and €70 
annually. This is due to the fact, that the net carbon 
accumulation does not differ very much between the 
four different systems. The relative impact is the most 
pronounced for the household type I which can realise 
an increase of up to 18 percent for high carbon credit 
prices of €25 tCO2e
-1, whereas for household type IV 
the corresponding impact is almost negligible. 
However, with current carbon prices no switches 
between the different systems are observed.  
Additionally, we assessed whether carbon payments 
could provide an incentive for the households to take 
up more of the biodiversity rich, shade intensive 
agroforestry system. Therefore, credits were targeted 
only towards the first two agroforestry systems which 
provide elevated environmental benefits due to their 
high-level ecosystem functioning and in the long run 
are more sustainable.  The results from the linear 
programming model indicate that with carbon credit 
prices of up to 32€ tCO2e
-1 the first three household 
types will adopt more of the sustainable agroforestry 
systems. These prices are in a range of offset credits to 
be observed on carbon markets currently and they are 
lower than the price premiums paid for organic cocoa. 
Only household type IV would need very high credit 
prices of 185€ tCO2e
-1 to induce him to adopt more of 
the less intensive cocoa production practices.  
On a regional scale for the research area there is a 
carbon offset potential of 1,300,000 tCO2e from all 
cocoa plantations which in comparison to the 
BioCarbon Fund Projects of the World Bank would be 
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in the upper range of their projects. This could lead to 
annual payments between €100,000 to €500,000 from 
the carbon sequestration of the agroforestry systems. 
However, the limits for a small scale afforestation 
project under the CDM, which only allows for an 
annual average greenhouse gas removal by sinks of 
less than 16.000 tCO2e, would be exceeded. Such a 
small-scale project could be an option for the AFS 
type I farmers, as the smallest area share among the 
cocoa plantations is planted with the full shade cocoa 
(264 hectares), and they would only need to gather a 
total area of their shade intensive cocoa agroforestry 
systems of 240 hectares. For more details on the 
results, please see [41]. 
B. Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation 
Avoiding deforestation is increasingly discussed 
nowadays on the climate change policies agenda, since 
it can provide an important strategy for avoiding 
greenhouse gas emissions in the first place. In a study 
by Jung [42] the estimates for the global potential for 
carbon uptake
5 through avoided deforestation are 11 
times higher than for plantations, regeneration and 
agroforestry together.  
The discussion on deforestation avoidance usually 
focuses on the national level. Yet incentives can also 
be set at the local level, as agricultural activities are 
often a major driving force of conversion processes. 
Therefore, we used the linear programming model to 
determine the necessary carbon prices at which 
households stop deforestation activities at the forest 
margin of the LLNP. The prices we obtained show a 
huge range. Annual payments of €5 per hectare are 
necessary to stop conversion activities of household 
type I, whereas household type II would need annual 
payments of €125, household type III of €300 and 
household type IV of even €700.  
It depends on the future arrangements for payment 
modalities for emission reductions from avoided 
deforestation whether the above calculated payments 
can be made. Discussions are still on-going and evolve 
around up-front and annual payments, setting the year 
                                                           
5 This does not represent the real carbon uptake but the one 
accounted for by the carbon accounting scheme used for forestry 
projects in the CDM. 
of the baseline etc. In addition, much discussion 
remains of who should be receiving payments for 
avoided deforestation, the state, the community or the 
farmers and how are these schemes to be 
implemented? For this case study we appraise the 
feasibility of these compensation payments made to 
farmers for not converting further forest with a simple 
projection. The current estimate for the carbon content 
of the LLNP forest is 435 tCO2e ha
-1 (M. Kessler, 
personal communication, 9. April 2008). Under the 
assumption that the current deforestation rate of 0.3% 
is reduced to 0, annual emissions of 13 tCO2e ha
-1 
could be avoided. Depending on the prices paid for 
avoided emissions from deforestation, payments 
between €65 and €326 per hectare could arise
6 (see 
Table 2). Different scenarios are calculated with a 
safety margin of a 25% lower and a 10% higher CO2e 
content of the forest, as it is not homogeneous over the 
entire Park area. 
 
Table 2 Scenarios of potential payments for avoided 
emissions from deforestation reduction 
(Source: own data) 
   Scenarios of different 
CO2e contents  
   Low Middle High 
Carbon content LLNP  t CO2e 
ha
-1 
326 435  479 
Annual emissions avoided 
(deforestation rate 




10 13  14 
Payments for different 
prices per tCO2e avoided 
      
   5 € tCO2e
-1 €  ha
-1 49 65  72 
12 € tCO2e
-1 €  ha
-1 117 157  172 
25 € tCO2e
-1 €  ha
-1 245 326  359 
 
If the prices paid for every ton of CO2e avoided are 
€12, the evolving payments are sufficiently high 
enough to provide an incentive for the household types 
I and II to stop forest conversion activities. If the 
prices were increased to €25 tCO2e
-1 avoided, even the 
household type III, who needs a compensation of €300 
per hectare, could be stimulated to desist from further 
tree cutting. Household type I, which only cuts down a 
few original forest trees and sets seedlings under the 
                                                           
6 Transaction costs are not considered, their inclusion would 
reduce the evolving payments. 
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remaining shade trees, obtains a much lower cocoa 
gross margin and, hence, needs a much lower 
compensation payment to stop forest conversion. In 
comparison, the household type IV receives a very 
high gross margin for the intensively managed cocoa. 
The need for these very high compensation payments 
arises through the opportunity costs of not converting 
forest which is the cocoa gross margin. 
As mentioned above, many of the households from 
the local ethnic groups are the drivers of the 
encroachment processes at the forest margin, selling 
the land to the newcomers who tend to have more 
intensively managed cocoa agroforestry systems (see 
also Table 1). This provokes a vicious circle, as after a 
while the local households who spend the income 
gained through land sales often on ceremonial 
purposes, will convert further forest to fulfil their 
subsistence needs (see Figure 1). If the compensation 
payments would be specifically targeted towards the 
shade intensive AFS I and II, who are mainly 
cultivated by the local ethnic groups, a solution could 
be provided to stop this vicious circle. On the one 
hand the increase in income will enable the poorest 
households to escape poverty and on the other hand 
they will not have the need anymore to convert 
additional forest in order to obtain more income and/or 
land.  
 
Figure 1. Vicious cycle of poverty and deforestation 














Are the payments for avoiding emissions from 
deforestation therefore a cost-efficient solution for the 
abatement of greenhouse gases when focusing only on 
agricultural production activities? Currently, there is 
much debate regarding biofuels and whether they 
actually contribute towards the reduction of 
greenhouse gases. Therefore, there is a call to develop 
an accounting system which calculates the entire life 
cycle analysis of the biofuels, and takes into account 
the direct and indirect land use changes and associated 
emissions, as well as air and toxic emissions, 
biodiversity, water and soil impacts. In addition, the 
discussion is now turning to the practical challenges of 
where and how emission reductions can best be 
achieved, at what costs, and over what periods of time. 
Therefore, it is interesting to also consider at a global 
scale which options can provide a cost-efficient 
solution to reach the abatement targets established by 
now in most countries. We compare the abatement 
costs of alternative biofuels to the opportunity costs of 
not converting the LLNP forest into a cocoa 
plantation. These are calculated by converting the net 
present values of the average cocoa agroforestry 
system, as well as the AFS IV to annuities, to derive 
the annual payments from a 100 year project horizon 
and divide these by the annually avoided tons of CO2e 
per hectare when completely reducing deforestation.
7 
Table 3 lists these different options of activities in the 
agricultural domain from different countries and one 
can see that bioethanol production from sugar cane in 
Brazil is the most cost-efficient solution with negative 
abatement costs of –27 € tCO2e
-1. Still, as a second 
option comes the avoided deforestation of the LLNP 
((AD LLNP) 23 or 55 € tCO2e
-1), which is far more 
effectual than the remaining biofuel options. These 
numbers, however, do not take into account other 
environmental services provided by  the forest, which 
obviously will raise its value even more. Also, the 
environmental costs associated with land use changes 
caused through diverting land from  previous 
agricultural activities or forest to biofuel production 
have not been considered. In Brazil the cerrado is 
converted for sugar cane or soybean production and 
the Amazon logged for producing soybeans, which 
increases the carbon debt of the obtained biofuels 
considerably. Bioethanol from sugar cane produced on 
ex cerrado land would take approximately 17 years to 
                                                           
7 The biofuels displace fossil fuels forever, whereas in this 
calculation the carbon emissions which are avoided by reducing 
deforestation are only displaced for 100 years. However, in 100 
years we should have hopefully encountered sufficient alternative 
energy sources to meet our needs. 




Land sales to 
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repay its carbon debt [5]. Yet, the transaction costs 
when implementing and carrying out a REDD project 
have also not been included in the calculation of the 
abatement costs for avoiding deforestation, which 
would lower its benefits. The costs can be quite 
considerable, and results from a study by Michaelowa 
and Jotzo [43] indicate transaction costs for forestry 
carbon projects to range from US$ 1.48 per tCO2 for 
large to US$ 14.78 per tCO2 for small ones.  
 
Table 3.  Abatement costs of biofuels and avoided 























































































































































































costs           
€ tCO2e
-1 
154 83  291 -27
8 290  23  53 
 
Therefore, if one searches for cost-efficient 
solutions on a global scale for the abatement of 
greenhouse gases among activities in the agricultural 
sector, it is reasonable to invest in the conservation of 
the LLNP before investing further in other biofuel 
options in Germany.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The present study demonstrates the importance to 
include options of decreasing deforestation activities 
when targeting the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions and searching for policy approaches. As 
discussed, it is the uncontrolled agricultural expansion 
at forest frontiers which undeniably contributes to its 
conversion and loss. Market-based mechanisms and 
incentive schemes, such as carbon credits either for 
land uses which offer additional carbon sequestration 
potential or for preserving land uses which store great 
                                                           
8Abatement costs are negative, because of a very good greenhouse 
gas balance and very low production costs. These are caused 
because Brazil has a long experience in developing sugar-growing 
and processing technology and its relatively low taxation of fossil 
fuels used in biofuel production [46]. 
quantities of carbon, can offer solutions for the 
sustainable management and conservation of forests. 
In fact, in this specific context of the Lore Lindu 
National Park in Central Sulawesi in Indonesia, the 
intensification process among the cocoa production 
systems leads to a gradual removal of original forest 
shade trees towards fully sun grown monocultures. 
This trend is not sustainable in the long run, as soil 
productivity declines and species-richness is reduced.  
Carbon certificates could be used as a price premium 
to reward households to carry out less intensively 
managed land use practices. Results show that they 
can offer the possibility to provide an incentive for the 
majority of households to adopt more of the shade 
intensive agroforestry systems. The analysis indicates 
that the farmers of the household types I-III would 
need differentiated prices to stimulate the switch 
towards the more sustainable land use systems, but 
that current prices which are observed on the carbon 
markets could doubtlessly be sufficient. Additionally, 
compensation payments can be used as an incentive 
for deforestation reduction, which ultimately leads to 
avoiding further greenhouse gas emissions. The 
analysis shows that the current carbon prices could be 
sufficient for three household types to stop them from 
forest conversion, whereas the better off households 
need extremely high compensation payments, which 
could not be generated with the current prices for 
carbon certificates. The inherent problem lays in the 
fact that the fully sun grown cocoa receives very high 
net-revenues, which makes it very difficult to provide 
viable and financially attractive alternative activities 
for these farmers. However, the poorest farmers, 
which are typically from the local ethnic groups, could 
be provided an additional income through the 
compensation payments. This can, in turn, have the 
benefit of reducing poverty and also decreasing their 
need of opening up further land in the National Park.  
If carbon payments are applied in general to all 
agroforestry systems there will be an impact on the 
households’ income, but no change with respect to 
land use systems. However, if other criteria, such as 
the provision of further environmental services are 
included, specific systems can be targeted in order to 
promote a switch towards these agroforestry systems. 
To conclude, one can say that for the carbon payments 
to be efficient and promote a shift towards land uses 
12
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which provide higher environmental benefits, 
payments targeted towards medium to high shade 
intensive land use systems would be needed. This 
could ensure that the changes are made into the 
desired direction. Additionally, we have observed that 
the poorer households seem to benefit relatively more 
than the better off from carbon payments. It seems as 
if win-win situations are possible, where both 
deforestation processes and poverty can be reduced 
with carbon payments and land use systems with high 
environmental benefits promoted.  
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